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Book Reviews
A Special Kind of Justice
Justice under Fire: A Study of Military Law. By Joseph W. Bishop, Jr.
New York: Charterhouse, 1974. Pp. xvi, 315. $8.95.
Reviewed by Edward F. Shermant
I
In his classic analysis of the judicial process, Cardozo identified
four forces which have shaped the development of the law-logic, his-
tory, custom, and social welfare-but observed that in a few areas of
the law history has been paramount; the conceptions "embody the
thought not so much of the present as of the past."' History has played
a prominent role in the development of military law, often to the
exclusion of other forces, and Professor Joseph W. Bishop's Justice
under Fire provides an admiring affirmation of that approach. Bishop,
Acting General Counsel of the Army in the early 1950's and Professor
of Law at Yale, is a traditionalist, a lover of the historical lore of
military law. He is a believer in orthodox military notions that com-
manders require broad powers in matters of discipline and training,
that civilian legal standards and procedures are often not transferable
to the military, and that in matters of national security, war, and
domestic disorder, the Executive must be given wide latitude in using
military force. He is not a dogmatic defender of the military; rather
he is a respecter of tradition with a good sense of history, a fine
writing ability, and a decent regard for rationality, but with a marked
distaste for the style of contemporary movements and ideas and a
general unwillingness to admit of the need for legal and institutional
changes in the military in response to them.
Bishop's thesis is that modem military law "is a variety of law that
has developed to meet the particular requirements of a particular part
of our polity," 2 and he concludes that distinctive military standards
t Professor of Law, Indiana University School of Law.
1. B. CARnozo, The Nature of the Judicial Process, in SELECTED WRITINGS OF BENJAMIIN
NATHAN CARDOZO 128-29 (N. Hall ed. 1947).
2. J. BIsHoP, JUSTICE UNDER FIRE: A STUDY OF MILITARY LAW xiv (1974) [hereinafter
cited to page number only].
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and procedures are generally necessary and reasonable. He addresses
five major aspects of military law-military justice, judicial protection
of servicemen's rights, the war power in the military sphere, martial
law and use of the military in non-war situations, and the interna-
tional laws of war. This is an enormous undertaking, involving dis-
parate and complex issues of criminal law, federal court procedure,
constitutional law, administrative law, and international law, and it
is not surprising therefore that Bishop does not provide a very com-
prehensive analysis of them in 304 pages. The best parts of the book
are taken from earlier law journal articles on civilian court review
of courts-martial and their jurisdiction. 3 Bishop's discussion of Vietnam
War issues is occasionally marred by petulance and defensiveness, as
he attempts to respond to "popular polemics" which he maintains
have ignorantly and unfairly criticized military law.4 As a result,
Justice Under Fire covers too much ground in too sketchy and ar-
gumentative a fashion to make a significant contribution to scholar-
ship. Nonetheless, it has value in providing an intelligible integration
of the branches of military law, in its sprightly discussion of complex
issues in an understandable way, and in its forceful presentation of
a pro-military argument in the contemporary debate over the quality
of military justice and legal control over the military in our society.
II
Bishop's defense of military justice is that it "is not a debasement
and corruption of the ordinary criminal process in the interest of
military discipline, but a very gradual and still partial homologization
of civilian criminal justice by a penal system with totally different
purposes and origins." 5 From this premise he concludes that the dis-
tinctive procedures followed in courts-martial, which sometimes fail
to provide all the safeguards given in civilian trials, are justified.
The premise itself is troubling. Military justice has different origins
from civilian criminal law, but it is not at all clear today that it has
or should have "totally different purposes." The court-martial of a
serviceman for murder, rape, larceny, or possession of marijuana has
the same basic purpose as the trial of a civilian for the same offense-
3. Bishop, Civilian Judges and Military Justice: Collateral Review of Court-Martial
Convictions, 61 COLUM. L. REv. 40 (1961); Bishop, Court-Martial Jurisdiction over Mili-
tary-Civilian Hybrids: Retired Regulars, Reservists, and Discharged Prisoners, 112 U. PA.
L. REv. 317 (1964).
4. P. xxi. See, e.g., R. SHERRILL, MILITARY JUSTICE IS TO JUSTICE AS MILITARY MUSIC IS
TO MusIc (1969).
5. P. 5.
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to determine guilt or innocence according to due process of law. Even
a court-martial for a typically military offense, such as absence without
leave or disobedience of orders, is not appreciably different in its
purposes from a civilian criminal trial. Once a commander chooses
to go beyond his considerable "disciplinary" powers under nonjudicial
punishment" to a court-martial, he is operating in the sphere of crim-
inal law, and an impartial determination of guilt or innocence should
be the principal objective. A court-martial may aid the commander
in maintaining discipline, but any deterrent effect should arise, as
in a civilian trial, only from a just and impartial determination of
guilt or innocence. Most Western nations have now come to accept the
idea that the court-martial should be an impartial judicial proceeding
rather than a disciplinary mechanism of the command.7
Professor Bishop takes the surprisingly rigid position that military
courts with distinctive disciplinary features are essential today. He
argues that military discipline cannot be preserved by the civilian
criminal process "which is neither swift nor certain," s ignoring the
possibility that divisions of federal courts could be created near mili-
tary posts to provide civilian trials of servicemen" and that strict rules
as to "speedy trial" are as feasible in civilian courts as in military.'0
6. Under Article 15(b), Uniform Code of Military Justice, 10 U.S.C. § 815(b) (1970)
[hereinafter cited as UCMJ], a field grade officer (major or naval lieutenant commander,
or above) may impose correctional custody for up to 30 days, forfeiture of up to one-half
of one month's pay for two months, reduction in rank, restrictions, and extra duties. An
officer below field grade can impose correctional custody for tip to seven days, forfeiture
of tip to seven days' pay, reduction of one rank, restrictions, and extra duties. A service-
man may refuse nonjudicial punishment and demand a summary or special court-martial.
MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL UNITED STATES (rev. ed. 1969) [hereinafter cited as MCM
1969], 132, at 26-8.
7. See INTERNATIONAL SociETY OF MILITARY LAW AND THE LAWS OF WVAR, THE SAFE-
GUARD OF INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS IN THE APPLICATION OF MILITARY LAW AND Disci-
PLINARY REGULATIONS (LE GARANTIES DES DROITS INDIVIDUELS DANS LA REPRESSION Dis-
CIPLINAIRE ET PfNALE MILITAIRE) 19 (1966). General William C. Westmoreland, Army
Chief of Staff, stated in a 1970 speech:
A military trial should not have a dual function as an instrument of discipline and
as an instrument of justice. It should be an instrument of justice and in fulfilling
this function, it will promote discipline.
Westmoreland, Military Justice-A Commander's Viewpoint, 10 AM%. CaNe. L. REv. 5, 8
(1971).
8. P. 21.
9. Sherman, Military Justice Without Military Control, 82 YALE L.J. 1398, 1400-01
(1973).
10. In 1971 the Court of Military Appeals (COMA) adopted the rule that "in the
absence of defense requests for continuance, a presumption of an Article 10 [requiring
immediate steps to try a person placed in confinement] violation will exist when pre-
trial confinement exceeds three months." United States v. Burton, 21 U.S.C.M.A. 112,
118, 44 C.M.R. 166, 172 (1971). This standard has been strictly applied, only permitting
exceptions in "really extraordinary circumstances." United States v. Marshall, 22
U.S.C.M.A. 431, 47 C.M.R. 409 (1973). This is consistent with the recommendation of
the ABA PROJECT ON IINIMUM STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, STANDARDS RELATING TO
SPEEDY TRIAL 2.1, at 14 (app. draft 1968), that time limits be established for a speedy
trial "expressed ... in terms of days or months running from specified events." A num-
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He glosses over the fact that West Germany has abolished its court-
martial system (as have Sweden, Austria and Denmark)1' with the claim
that it was simply "reacting against a monstrous overdose of mili-
tarism, at a time when Germany had no armed forces and no spokes-
men for the military point of view.' 12 He fails to note that the West
German armed force is one of the largest in the world today,' 3 has
an excellent record for efficiency, 14 consistently scoring well in joint
NATO exercises,' and has generally found, after some 22 years with-
out courts-martial, that the trial of servicemen in civilian courts has
been fairer and has enhanced morale.16 Finally, Bishop's argument that
civilian judges and jurors lack the experience and knowledge to try
military crimes'7 overlooks the fact that jurors often decide cases in
specialized areas of the law of which they have little personal knowl-
edge and that European countries which have abolished courts-martial
have found civilian judges competent to try military offenses.
Bishop also defends the distinctive features of the court-martial.
"Since discipline," he says, "is a responsibility of the military com-
mander, he should have some control of the machinery by which it
is enforced."' s Thus he defends the most criticized aspect of military
ber of state courts have adopted specific time limit speedy trial rules. Note, Speedy Trial
Schemes and Criminal Justice Delay, 57 CORNELL L. REV. 794, 802-12 (1972). The Second
Circuit adopted rules in 1971 providing that if a defendant is detained, the government
must be ready for trial within 90 days from detention, 8A MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE, 4
48.03[l], at 48-11 n.1 (2d ed. 1974); federal district courts are now required to have a
plan for prompt disposition of criminal cases, including specific time limits for trials.
FED. R. CRIM. P. 50(b).
11. See INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY OF MILITARY LAW AND THE LAWS OF WAR, supra note
7, at 10, 46.
12. P. 20.
13. U.S. ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY, 'WORLD MILITARY EXPENDITURES
1971, at 51 (1972).
14. Bishop states that "[t]here is some evidence that in the West German army the
incidence of absence without leave, desertion, and insubordination is so high as to raise
serious doubt of its ability to defend the country." P. 21 (citing only an article in Tile
Economist, Mar. 18, 1972, at 34). This does not jibe with other reports, both official and
unofficial, of West German army performance. See Jerb, "Despite Gripes In and Out of
Bundeswehr West German Soldiers Called Better Than Their Reputation," Louisville
Courier-Journal, May 31, 1971, at B1, col. 1. There was an increase in unauthorized
absences in the West German army from 2,705 in 1968 to 7,767 in 1972. FEDERAL MINISTRY
OF DEFENSE, WHITE PAPER 1973/1974 ON THE SECURITY OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC or
GERMANY AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE FEDERAL ARMED FORCES 147. But this trend was
reversed in 1973. Id. At the worst point in 1972, the absence rate was about 16.5 per 1,000
soldiers. In contrast, the rate in the U.S. army has been many times higher, reaching 62.6
per 1,000 in the fiscal 1971. Desertion Rate-Up, Up and Away, N.Y. Times, Aug. 15, 1971,
§ 4, at 4, col. 7; REPORT OF THE COMM. ON ARMED SERVICES BY THE SUBCOMM. ON TREAT-
MENT OF DESERTERS FROM MILITARY SERVICE, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 23-24 (1969).
15. FEDERAL MINISTRY OF DEFENSE, WHITE PAPER 1970 ON THE SECURITY or
THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY AND ON THE STATE OF THE GERMAN FEDERAL ARMED
FORCES 43.
16. See Sherman, supra note 9, at 1408.
17. P. 24.
18. Id.
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justice-the power of the commander who is court-martialling one of
his men to carry out what civilians would view as judicial functions.
For example, the commander determines whether there is sufficient
evidence to prosecute, selects court members and counsel from his
subordinates, and reviews the conviction and sentence. Bishop con-
cedes that "[t]here is no doubt that [the commander's] unique in-
terest and powers create at least a possibility of unfairness,"' 0 but in
his modest recommendations for change at the end of the book, he
suggests only that the commander's power to set aside a conviction or
order a new trial be limited.20 Even members of the military have
gone farther than this.21
The commander's most controversial power-the selection of the
court (the equivalent of a jury) by the commander from among his
officers-causes Bishop little concern. He concedes that a commander
has "a lot of leeway to select the sort of members most likely to do
what he regards as justice-i.e., to pack the 'jury'." 22 He also concedes
that, although an enlisted defendant can request that the court be
composed of one-third enlisted men, the enlisted men selected are al-
most always hard-boiled senior noncommissioned officers.23 But in what
is surely one of the most dubious arguments in the book, he assures
us that "the accused can eliminate such danger as really exists, or he
thinks exists, that the commander will influence the result of the
trial by handpicking or otherwise influencing the 'jury'" by waiving
his right to trial by jury and being tried by a career officer military
judge.24 Since military judges lack the independence of civilian judges,
trial by a military judge is hardly an adequate substitute for a trial
by jury of peers.
Bishop's assertion that commanders must control court-martial ma-
chinery has an anachronistic ring. Commanders may once have had
to control their troops with the fear of personal retribution through
court-martial, but today's military is not composed of ignorant men
from the dregs of society. It is composed of relatively well-educated
19. Pp. 43-44.
20. P. 301.
21. For example, Major General Kenneth J. Hodson, former Army Judge Advocate
General and Chief Judge of the Army Court of Military Review, has expressed support
for removing the commander from the court-martial process except for post-trial
clemency purposes, observing that "[t]he commander and his legal advisor are the
'government,' and their authority prior to and during trial should extend only to
filing a 'complaint' with the court and providing a prosecutor." Hodson, Courts-Martial
and the Commander, 10 SAN DiEco L. REv. 51, 53-54 (1973).
22. P. 29.
23. P. 28.
24. P. 32.
The Yale Law Journal
personnel trained in highly technical jobs and enjoying more indi-
vidual rights than ever before in history. Bishop's view of servicemen
as "an aggregation of men (mostly in the most criminally prone age
brackets) who have strong appetites, strong passions, and ready access
to deadly weapons" 25 may fit into the military picture, but military
leadership no longer maintains that the way to control them is with
rigid discipline and the personal absolutism of the commander. 23
Despite his interesting use of history in illuminating the court-martial
system, Bishop makes no mention of the considerable body of post-
World War II research into military motivation and deterrence.
2 7
These studies have indicated that "buddy relations," peer group stand-
ards, and a sense of purpose and self-esteem are more likely to produce
combat proficiency and high morale than deterrence through dis-
cipline or the threat of court-martial.2 8
The administration of the court-martial system by judges and coun-
sel who are military officers has long troubled critics of military
justice. Following World War II, Great Britain responded to this
concern by providing civilian judges for courts-martial and civilian de-
fense counsel through legal aid.29 Bishop is satisfied with the all-mili-
25. P. 23.
26. U.S. ARMY INFANTRY SCHOOL, MILITARY LEADERSHIP (Nov. 1965) (FM 22-100); OFFICE
OF THE DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF FOR PERSONNEL AND THE U.S. MILITARY ACADEMY, PROCEED-
INGS FOR THE JUNIOR OFFICER LEADERSHIP WORKSHOP ON CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS 23-33, 39-
52, 134-51 (May 1972); U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE, STUDY ON LEADERSHIP FOR THE 1970's (July
1, 1971).
27. See, e.g., THE AMERICAN SOLDIER: COMBAT AND ITS AFTERMATH (2 Stud. Soc. Psych.
in World War II, 1949); J. SPENCER, CRIME AND THE SERVICES (1954); ARMY HUMAN
RELATIONS RESEARCH OFFICE, A STUDY OF EFFECTIVE AND INEFFECTIVE COMBAT PERFORMERS
(Spec. Rep. No. 13, 1958); M. JANOWITZ, THE PROFESSIONAL SOLDIER: A SOCIAL AND POLITICAL
PORTRAIT (1960); M. JANOWITZ & R. LITTLE, SOCIOLOGY AND THE MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT
(1965); THE NEW 'MILITARY: CHANGING PATTERNS OF ORGANIZATION (M. Janowitz ed. 1964);
C. MOSKOS, THE AMERICAN ENLISTED MAN: THE RANK AND FILE IN TODAY'S MILITARY (1970);
A. YARMOLINSKY, THE MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT: ITS IMPACT ON AMERICAN SOCIETY (1971);
PUBLIC OPINION AND THE MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT (C. Moskos ed. 1971); CONSCIENCE AND
COMMAND: JUSTICE AND DISCIPLINE IN THE MILITARY (J. Finn ed. 1971); THE MILITARY
INDUSTRIAL COMPLEX: A REASSESSMENT (S. Sarkesian ed. 1972). See generally K. LANG,
MILITARY INSTITUTIONS AND THE SOCIOLOGY OF WAR: A REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE WITH
ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY (1972).
28. See, e.g., Kiev & Giffen, Some Observations on Airmen Who Break Down During
Basic Training, 122 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 184 (1965); Little, Buddy Relations and Combat
Performance, in THE NEw MILITARY (M. Janowitz ed. 1967); Smith, Combat Motivations
among Ground Troops, in THE AMERICAN SOLDIER: COMBAT AND ITS AFTERMATH 105 (2
Stud. Soc. Psych. in World War II, 1949); cf. W. GAYLIN, IN THE SERVICE OF TIIEIR
COUNTRY: WAR RESISTERS IN PRISON (1970); J. GRAY, THE WARRIORS: REFLECTIONS ON
MEN IN BATTLE (1959).
In addition, recent studies of racial aspects of military justice by the NAACP, THE
SEARCH FOR MILITARY JUSTICE: REPORT ON AN NAACP INQUIRY INTO THE PROBLEMS or
THE NEGRO SERVICEMAN IN WEST GERMANY (1971), and a task force appointed by the
Secretary of Defense, DEP'T OF DEFENSE TASK FORCE ON THE ADMINISTRATION OF MILITARY
JUSTICE IN THE ARMED FORCES, REPORT (1972), also recommended considerable lessening of
commanders' powers over judicial functions.
29. See Shermap, supra note 9, at 1403-07.
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tary administration of the American court-martial, recommending only
that more civilians be used as defense counsel and military judges. He
quite rightly observes that the independence of military judges has
been strengthened by the Military Justice Act of 1968 which puts
them under the Judge Advocate General rather than the commander
convening authority.30 Military judges have also generally become
more "judicial," wearing robes in some services. However, as Bishop
admits, a military judge is still "an officer of the service, with a
professional interest in discipline." 31 The changes have not removed
him from the ultimate command of a military officer or from the
inherent career pressures towards accommodation in the officer society
of a military installation. Sometimes pressure has been applied to mili-
tary judges, especially lower-ranking special court-martial judges, rang-
ing from criticism by commanders passed on to their superiors in the
legal corps to sudden transfers or reassignment to nonjudicial duties.32
This is the danger in having judges who are career officers and who
can be reassigned to nonjudicial duties at any time.33
30. P. 44.
31. Id.
32. See Testimony before Dep't of Defense Task Force on the Administration of
Military Justice in the Armed Forces, May 24, 1972, that a special court-martial judge at
Ft. Hood in 1971, whose commanding general complained of his dismissal of a case to
the Army JAG, was later replaced by a career colonel and that a special court-martial
judge in I Corps, Vietnam in 1971 was transferred because his sentences were considered
to be too light. (Transcript of testimony on file with the Yale Law Journal.)
33. Bishop's defense of military defense counsel also fails to recognize the realities of
pressure within the tight career structure of the military. He equates the situation of a
serviceman represented by a military attorney with an indigent civilian defendant rep-
resented by a public defender, without acknowledging that a public defender is in-
dependent of the prosecutor and government while a military attorney is a subordinate
officer tinder the commander who has ordered the court-martial and part of the command
structure of the officer corps. Bishop recommends that defense counsel be put under the
command of the Judge Advocate General rather than the commander, a proposal made
by the 1972 Task Force which the services were ordered to implement. See Memorandum
of Secretary of Defense Laird, Jan. 11, 1973, ordering that defense comnsel be removed
from local command and put under JAG's, 1 MIL. L. REP. 1005 (1973); Memorandum of
Army JAG, Providing Adequate Defense Services-The Defense Counsel, DAJA-MJ 1973/
12018, suggesting, inter alia, separating defense counsel from other SJA offices, 1 MIL.
L. REP. 1067 (1974). Bishop's statement that "military defense counsel seem to me to
raise as many defenses, and push them as hard, as lawyers in civilian trials," p. 34, is not
supported by general experience. It was civilian attorneys who raised challenges to the
constitutionality of provisions of the UCMJ, such as those alleging overbroad court-
martial jurisdiction, see, e.g., O'Callahan v. Parker, 395 U.S. 258 (1969); Reid v. Covert,
354 U.S. 1 (1957); United States ex rel. Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11 (195); Cole v. Laird,
468 F.2d 829 (5th Cir. 1972), and vague offenses, see, e.g., Parker v. Levy, 94 S. Ct. 2547
(1974), rev'g 478 F.2d 772 (3d Cir. 1973); Stolte v. Laird, 353 F. Supp. 1302 (D.C. Cir.
1972). Virtually all of the landmark cases of the Vietnam War era which struck down
military justice practices, such as restrictive limitations on free speech, Allen v. Monger,
Civil No. 73-745 RFP (N.D. Cal. Aug. 23, 1974); Carlson v. Schlesinger, 364 F. Supp. 626
(D.D.C. 1973); United States v. Daniels, 19 U.S.C.M.A. 529, 42 C.M.R. 131 (1970); cf.
Yahr v. Resor, 431 F.2d 690 (4th Cir. 1970); United States v. Priest, 21 U.S.C.M.A. 564,
-45 C.M.R. 338 (1972); United States v. Howe, 17 U.S.C.M.A. 165, 37 C.M.R. 429 (1967),
invasions of personal privacy through drug abuse programs, Committee for G.I. Rights
v. Callaway, 370 F. Supp. 934 (D.D.C. 1974), and denial of counsel in summary courts-
The Yale Law Journal Vol. 84: 373, 1974
In the area of procedural due process, Bishop rightly notes that mili-
tary justice compares favorably with civilian justice.34 The military
equivalent to a g-rand jury, the Article 32 investigation, is far fairer,
entitling the accused to be represented by an attorney, cross-examine
witnesses, and present evidence. Bishop, however, does not mention
that the Article 32 investigation is only required in a general court-
martial, the commander having broad powers to determine whether
to prosecute in special and summary courts-martial. 35
Bishop's discussion of military search and seizure is similarly in-
complete. He observes that there are differences from civilian prac-
tices; for example, searches are authorized by the military commander
martial, Betonie v. Sizemore, 496 F.2d 1001 (5th Cir. 1974); Henry v. Warner. 357 F. Supp.
495 (C.D. Cal. 1973), were filed and won by civilian attorneys. Although military counsel
have been hesitant to challenge provisions of the UCMJ and have been timid on free
speech issues, they have demonstrated commendable adversary zeal in most areas of due
process, particularly concerning search and seizure and speedy trial. Command influence
was rarely raised by military counsel despite widespread violations by commanders, see
West, A History of Command Influence on the Military Judicial System, 18 U.C.L.A.
L. REV. 1 (1970), but in recent years it has been raised with increasing frequency.
Military attorneys may not, without express permission, represent clients in federal
courts, where constitutional issues must often be raised if adequate relief is to be ob-
tained. Permission has generally been denied. See Army Reg. No. 27-40 (June 15, 1973);
Attorney-Client Guidelines, ARMY LAw., June 1973, at 15-19 (Pamp. 27-50-6). Without
questioning the conscientiousness of military lawyers as defense counsel, one may still
conclude that their emotional identification with the command and their concern for not
making waves which will swamp their careers make them less than ideal advocates for a
military defendant's cause.
34. P. 38. Bishop offers the oft-cited example that warnings as to rights must be
given for a sample of a suspect's handwriting to be admissible in military but not
civilian courts. See United States v. Penn, 18 U.S.C.M.A. 194, 39 C.M.R. 194 (1969). See
generally Moyer, Procedual Rights of the Military Accused: Advantages over a Civilian
Defendant, 22 ME. L. REV. 105 (1970). On the other hand, a serviceman, obliged to
obey lawful orders of superiors, may not be entitled to warnings against self-incrimina-
tion in a variety of situations when questioned by officers, military doctors, chaplains,
investigating officers, or security officers, even though suspected of a crime. United
States v. Henry, 21 U.S.C.M.A. 98, 44 C.M.R. 152 (1971) (officer); United States v.
Fisher, 21 U.S.C.M.A. 223, 44 C.M.R. 277 (1972) (doctor); United States v. Vogel, 18
U.S.C.M.A. 160, 39 C.M.R. 160 (1969) (chaplain); Army JAG Inst. 1969/3370, Jan. 31,
1969 (investigating officer); United States v. Ledbetter, 18 U.S.C.M.A. 67, 39 C.M.R. 67
(1968) (dicta) (security officer).
35. General courts-martial account for less than 5 percent of the total courts-martial
in the armed forces. See ANNUAL REPORT OF THE U.S. COURT OF MILITARY APP-EA.S AND
THE JUDGE ADvocATEs GENERAL OF THE ARMED FORCES AND THE GENERAL COUNSEL OF
THE DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION PURSUANT TO THE UCMJ 18 (1971).
Even in a general court-martial, the investigating officer's finding that there is in-
sufficient evidence to prosecute is only a recommendation which can be ignored by the
commander. In the 1969 Presidio courts-martial trials of 27 servicemen for participating
in a sit-down strike to protest stockade conditions, the investigating officer was told by
his superior that the commanding general felt strongly that the men should be pros-
ecuted for mutiny and was warned "not to investigate too deeply." F. GARDNER, Til
UNLAWFUL CONCLRT: AN ACCOUNT OF TIlE PRESIDIO MUTINY CASE 99 (1970). He enraged
the command by finding there was insufficient evidence and recommending that sQme of
the charges be dropped. His recommendations were overruled by the commanding
general and the men were tried and convicted of mutiny. The convictions were ultimately
reversed by the Army Court of Military Review for lack of evidence of mutinous intent,
but only after the men had spent considerable time in prison. United States v. Sood, 42
C.M.R. 635 (A.C.M.R.), petition for review denied, 20 U.S.C.M.A. 636, 42 C.M.R. 356
(1970).
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having jurisdiction of the premises rather than by a judge.30 This
might seem a minor difference, except that the commander authorizing
the search may be the person who suspects the serviceman of a crime
and who will exercise all the powers described earlier over the service-
man's trial. In contrast, civilian practice requires a warrant to be
issued by a "neutral and detached magistrate" 37 and to be based upon
a statement in writing or sworn to-a requirement not imposed on a
military commander.38 Bishop also slides over the much criticized "ad-
ministrative searches" such as inspections, inventories, and "shake-
downs," some of which military courts have held are not subject to
the requirements of the Fourth Amendment 3 9 Administrative inspec-
tions in civilian life, such as that of a health inspector or fire chief,40
are covered by the Fourth Amendment, although the standards may be
less demanding than for a warrant in a criminal case. 41 The military
courts, however, permit unannounced "shakedowns" and inspections
of servicemen's property not only for administrative purposes (such
as ensuring that government property is accounted for or that standards
of cleanliness are being followed) but also when a commander knows
a crime has been committed and seeks the identity of the criminal.4 2
Evidence seized may be made the basis of a court-martial whether it
relates to the purpose of the administrative search or not. There is
obviously a capacity for abuse; it is difficult to prove that an inspec-
tion administered to all was really aimed at one individual or was
just a "fishing expedition" by the commander.43
Two features of military justice found by the 1972 Secretary of
Defense's task force to be most criticized by minority group servicemen
and to possess serious deficiencies-administrative discharges and non-
36. P. 37. Apparently, some Army search warrants are now issued by military judges.
See Army Reg. No. 27-10, ch. 14 (Change No. 9, July 19, 1972); McNeill, Jr., Recent
Trends in Search and Seizure, 54 MIL. L. REV. 83, 94-95, 95 n.48 (1971).
37. See Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971).
38. See Quinn, Some comparisons between Courts-Martial and Civilian Practice, 15
U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1240, 1254 (1968).
39. Pp. 145-46. See United States v. Lange, 15 U.S.C.M.A. 486, 35 C.M.R. 458 (1965);
United States v. Goldfinds, 41 C.M.R. 500 (A.C.M.R. 1969). See generally MCM 1969, EJ
152, at 52.62 to -65.
40. Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967); See v. Seattle, 387 U.S. 541 (1967).
41. Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309 (1971); Collonade Catering Corp. v. United States,
397 U.S. 72 (1970).
•12. United States v. Harman, 12 U.S.C.M.A. 180, 187, 30 C.M.R. 180, 187 (1961).
43. The American Civil Liberties Union has urged that each serviceman be permitted
a separate locker or section of it for personal use "protected by the same right of privacy
that a civilian enjoys in his or her own home" and "subject to searches only under
civilian Fourth Amendment standards." ACLU Board Res. No. 8, Special Comm. on
Military Rights (1973). The ACLU seems to be one of Bishop's archvillains, along with the
New York Times, Ramsey Clark, Justice Douglas, Jane Fonda. the Berrigans, George
McGovern, Daniel Ellsberg, anti-draft lawyers, "pious liberals," and "polemicists like
Leonard Boudin." Pp. 9, 19, 22, 80, 140, 148, 200, 205, 250, 258, 259, 269, 272, 274, 278.
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judicial punishment 44-are scarcely mentioned by Bishop. Some half-
million servicemen received less-than-honorable discharges during the
Vietnam War, ranging from dishonorable and bad conduct discharges
given by courts-martial to undesirable (and now clemency) discharges
resulting from administrative proceedings. Bishop recommends abol-
ishing the bad conduct discharge (which he says is not appreciably less
severe than dishonorable) and only empowering three-judge or five-
judge military courts to issue dishonorable discharges.4 5 But this
does not reach the real problem. A high percentage of less-than-
honorable discharges result from administrative board proceedings40
which lack certain basic due process guarantees, 47 and even these
"bad" discharges have such an adverse impact upon employability as
to constitute a continuing lifetime punishment.48
44. Nonjudicial punishment administered by commanders under Article 15 of the
UCMJ was found by the task force to provide "the greatest opportunity for the practice
of racial discrimination." It found that disproportionate numbers of blacks received
nonjudicial punishment for major "military/civilian" and "status/confrontation" of-
fenses and expressed concern as to "'lack of uniformity among and within the Services in
its use and review of its use; inappropriateness of some punishments; underutilization of
alternative measures which might obviate the need for nonjudicial punishments; and the
breadth of discretion." It recommended extensive changes in nonjudicial punishment
procedures, some of which have been implemented by the services. DEl'T OF DEFESr
TASK FORCE, supra note 33, at 70. Its recommendations include greater utilization of
normal aspects of command such as counselling, admonitions, and withholding of pri-
ileges rather than Article 15; standardization of nonjudicial punishment procedures
among the services; the right to advice from a legally qualified military counsel before
deciding whether to demand trial in lieu of nonjudicial punishment; the right to be
accompanied by a representative, including a lawyer, at the hearing; opening hearings
to spectators; calling witnesses when there are controverted questions of fact; not imposing
both forfeiture of pay and reduction in grade as both carry a loss of income; requiring
commanders imposing a reduction in grade upon a first offender to state reasons; and
staying punishment pending appeal. Id.
45. Pp. 301-02.
46. The percentage of less-than-honorable discharges issued administratively, rather
than through court-martial, in 1970-73, were 92.30 percent in the Army, 66.40 percent in
the Navy, 80.50 percent in the Marine Corps, and 83.66 percent in the Air Force. Com-
ment, Punishment of Enlisted Personnel Outside the UCMJ: A Statutory and Equal
Protection Analysis of Military Discharge Certificates, 9 H.Rv. Civ. RIGrHTs-Civ. LIB. L.
Rrv. 227, 276 11.211 (1974). It has not been uncommon to "board out" an individual with
an undesirable discharge administratively when there was insufficient evidence to con-
vict in a court-martial. Id. at 273-76.
47. An undesirable discharge is awarded after a hearing by a board of military
officers, generally nonlawyers. A member of the service is entitled to legally trained
military counsel if reasonably available. There is no presiding judge, Nerbatini record,
or appeal to a formal tribunal (only review by the officer who convened the board). The
defendant is not entitled to compulsory attendance of witnesses, and, as an administra-
tive proceeding, the board is not bound by rules of evidence applicable in a trial.
Defendants often waive their right to a board hearing; the waiver does not comply with
safeguards required for a judicial plea of guilty. A general discharge can be awarded
without a hearing in two services for servicemen with under eight years in the military,
the serviceman only being entitled to make a statement in his own behalf. See id. at
288-99, 321-22; Fairbanks, Disciplinary Discharges-Restricting the Coinmander's Discre-
tion, 22 HASTINs L.J. 291, 315-16 (1971).
48. See Jones, The Gravity of Administrative Discharges: A Legal and Empirical
Foundation, 59 MIL. L. REv. 1 (1973); DEi"T OF DEFENSE TASK FORCE, supra note 28, at
109; Hearings on H.R. 523 Before Subconn. No. 3 of the House Comm. on Armed
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III
Professor Bishop completes his treatment of military justice with
a separate chapter on court-martial jurisdiction. Although space is de-
voted to cases and issues of only historical interest,49 this sort of
historical development finds him at his best and much more per-
ceptive than when simply marshalling arguments to respond to the
military's critics. His criticisms of the 1969 landmark case of O'Calla-
han v. Parker, which struck down court-martial jurisdiction over
offenses not "service-connected," are adversary and hard-hitting, but
he fairly concludes that military efficiency has not been harmed by
O'Callahan.50
Bishop also includes in this chapter a discussion of the alleged
vagueness and overbreadth of the "general articles." He finds these
quaint and historic offenses ("conduct unbecoming an officer and a
gentleman" under Article 133, and under Article 134, "disorders and
neglects to the prejudice of good order and discipline" and "conduct
of a nature to bring discredit upon the armed forces") "downright
nebulous" and recommends their repeal. He notes that acts charged
under Article 133 "that show unfitness for command are either charge-
able as crimes [i.e., can be prosecuted under narrowly drawn of-
fenses in the UCMJ], punishable by punitive discharge, or grounds
for administrative elimination from the service" and that Article 134
conduct "should be replaced by articles specifically proscribing the
offenses." But he also comments that "almost all of the acts actually
charged under these articles, notably drug offenses, are of a sort
which ordinary soldiers know, or should know, to be punishable." 51
These comments found their way shortly after publication into Justice
Blackmun's concurring opinion in Parker v. Levy, the case which
upheld the constitutionality of the general articles.5 2 Blackmun used
this quote from Bishop to lead into an argument that "[t]he subtle
airs that govern the command relationship are not always capable
Services, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 5825 (1971); Joint Hearings on Bills to Improve the Ad-
ministration of Justice in the Armed Forces Before the Subcomm. on Constitutional
Rights of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary and a Spec. Subcoimm. of the Senate Comn.
on Armed Services, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 285-300 (1966); Hearings on Constitutional Rights
of Military Personnel Before the Subconn. on Constitutional Rights of the Senate
Cotnn. on the Judiciary, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 160 (1962).
49. 395 U.S. 258 (1969).
50. It is hard to argue that much harm is done to military efficiency by removing
from military control the sort of soldier who typically gets in trouble with the
civilian authorities. If he is innocent, he is returned to the service; if he is guilty,
the Army can probably get along without him.
P. 100.
51. Pp. 87-88, 302.
52. 94S. Ct. 2547, 2565 (1974).
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of specification" and that the general articles are essential "to foster
an orderly and dutiful fighting force." 53 This, of course, is incon-
sistent with Bishop's judgment that the general articles a.re unnecessary
because the conduct sought to be regulated by them can be specifically
defined or made the ground for elimination from the service rather
than criminal prosecution, but Blackmun was apparently interested
in the assurance that the general articles provide military men adequate
notice of what is criminal.
Bishop does not suggest how ordinary soldiers today "know, or
should know" what acts are punishable under the general articles
when, as the Third Circuit observed in Levy, they employ vague
terms like "gentleman" which has no technical meaning and is "replete
with its capacity for subjective interpretation."' 4 Justice Stewart noted
that Article 133 has recently been used to punish such disparate con-
duct as dishonorable failure to repay debts and having an extramarital
affair, and Article 134 for windowpeeping in a trailer park, cheating
at bingo, and having sexual relations with a chicken. The issue, as
Stewart wrote in dissent in Levy, "is not whether the military may
adopt substantive rules different from those that govern civilian so-
ciety, but whether the serviceman has the same right as his civilian
counterpart to be informed as to precisely what conduct those rules
proscribe before he can be criminally punished for violating them.",;
Bishop provides an excellent historical discussion of the gradual
expansion of federal court review of military determinations and en-
forcement of servicemen's constitutional rights. His analysis of the
1953 landmark decision of Burns v. Wilson"6 nicely relates the con-
fusion resulting from the four different opinions, none commanding
a majority. The case establishes at least that federal courts, on habeas
corpus, will consider deprivations of constitutional rights in a court-
martial which the military manifestly refused to consider. Noting
that only a few lower federal courts have been willing to expand
collateral review of courts-martial to the same extent as that of civilian
criminal proceedings, he observes that the Supreme Court sooner or
later will have to decide "whether there is any good reason why mili-
53. Id.
54. Parker v. Levy, 478 F.2d 772 (3d Cir. 1973). But see MCM 1969, 212-13, at
28-70 to -81 (gives some indication of what offenses will be punished under the general
articles).
55. 94 S. Ct. at 2572-73. The Court held that because the military regulates conduct
permissible in the civilian sphere the standard for review of a military offense is not
that applicable to normal criminal offenses, but to criminal statutes regulating eco-
nomic affairs, in which the same high standard of definiteness is not required.
56. 346 U.S. 137 (1953).
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tary tribunals should not be subject to the same quality of, consti-
tutional policing as state criminal courts."T He seems to lean towards
an affirmative answer, but with his ubiquitous qualification that "[t]he
process that is due a soldier is not necessarily the same as that due
a civilian."' 8
Bishop has a rather long list of constitutional rights which he finds
"expressly or by necessary implication inapplicable" 9 to the military.
Bail, he says, has never been known in military law although the
UCMJ and Manual for Courts-Martial "provide criteria for the ac-
cused's rights to freedom pending trial and appeal, which to me make
more sense than conditioning his freedom on his ability to raise
high bail."00 Resort by civilian courts in recent years to release on
personal recognizance based on a finding that the individual is not
likely to flee is certainly preferable to money bail. The difficulty with
the military practice, however, which Bishop fails to mention, is
that the commander determines whether a serviceman will be granted
release pending trial or appeal and has broad discretion to impose
confinement if "deemed necessary to insure the presence of the ac-
cused at the trial or because of the seriousness of the offense" charged.0 1
The overuse of pretrial confinement by commanders was one of the
great scandals in military justice during the Vietnam War. 2 Military
courts have rarely been willing to overrule commanders' decisions not
to grant release. 3 Similarly, the usual military practice is that a con-
victed serviceman begins serving his sentence immediately, and a 1968
amendment to the UCMJ giving commanders the power to defer
serving of sentence pending appeal has also been interpreted as
establishing broad discretion.0 4 As a result, a serviceman may serve all
or part of his sentence before the appeals are completed, making
reversal a hollow victory. A proposal to have military judges make
the decision as to release pending trial and appeal has not been
widely adopted.
57. P. 133.
58. Id.
59. P. 139.
60. P. 140.
61. MCM 1969, 1 20c, at 5-3.
62. See DEP'T OF THE ARMY, REPORT OF THE SPECIAL CIVILIAN COMM. FOR THE STUDY
OF THE U.S. ARMY CONFINEMENT SYSrEM (May 15, 1970); cf. F. GARDNER, supra note 35.
63. For example, a private charged in a special court-martial with making disloyal
statements was unsuccessful in seeking to overturn his pretrial confinement although, as
he argued to COMA, Lt. William Calley, charged with 102 murders in a general court-
martial, was released pending trial. Homer v. Resor, 19 U.S.C.M.A. 285, 41 C.M.R. 285
(1970).
64. See Walker v. United States, 18 U.S.C.M.A. 247, 41 C.M.R. 247 (1970); Reed v.
Ohman, 19 U.S.C.M.A. 110, 41 C.M.R. 110 (1969).
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Rights of privacy and individuality have little place in Professor
Bishop's conception of the military, 65 nor does he have much trouble
justifying most of the military's restrictions upon servicemen's free
speech rights. The Supreme Court requires, at least for civilians, a
clear and present danger of unlawful action rising to the level of
incitement before speech can be suppressed.0 6 Bishop suggests that
all that should be required in the military is "some substantial basis
for the military commander's conclusion that the expression of opinion
presented, in the particular circumstances, a clear and present danger
to military discipline and efficiency." 67 He does question the con-
stitutionality of Article 88 forbidding officers from uttering "con-
temptuous words" against the President and other officials, at least as
applied in the 1965 court-martial of Lt. Howe for carrying an anti-
Johnson poster in an off-post peace rally. 8 However, he finds that the
1967 court-martial of two black Marines for making antiwar statements
in a bull session was a case in which the military courts could reason-
ably conclude that "the tinder was so dry that the defendants' sparks
could really have started a fire." 9
All critical words, of course, are "sparks" which could conceivably
result in members of the service disobeying orders, becoming dis-
affected, or slackening their discipline and efficiency. But service per-
sonnel are citizens and voters, and insulating them from the discussion
of controversial public issues could result in a military cutoff from
societal concerns and values, itself a threat to a democracy. And the
view that the military can punish all statements deemed adversely to
affect motivation and morale, as the D.C. district court observed in
65. Bishop notes that "[t]he Civil War was fought by gencrals so luxuriantly be-
whiskered as to be practically lurking in ambush, many of them both brave and com-
petent," pp. 144-45, but nevertheless raises no objection to contemporary regulations
limiting the length and style of servicemen's hair. He sarcastically refers to recent suits
challenging the military's right to forbid long-haired reservists to wear short-hair wigs at
drills as raising a "momentous question." See p. 170 n.103. In fact, it is a matter of
considerable import to the million reservists and national guardsmen whose appearance
in civilian life is affected by the military's requirement that they wear their hair in a
style incompatible with contemporary standards. Finding no military necessity for a ban
on wigs at drills and no justification for permitting men to wear wigs to cover baldness
but not to cover long hair, a number of courts have found these regulations uncon-
stitutional. See Hough v. Seaman, 493 F.2d 298 (4th Cir. 1974); Friedman v. Froehlke,
470 F.2d 1351 (1st Cir. 1972); Etheridge v. Schlesinger, 362 F. Snpp. 198 (E.D. Va. 1973).
But see Agrati v. Laird, 440 F.2d 683 (9th Cir. 1971).
66. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
67. P. 160.
68. Pp. 157-58. See United States v. Howe, 17 U.S.C.M.A. 165, 37 C.M.R. 429 (1967).
69. P. 160. See United States v. Daniels, 19 U.S.C.M.A. 529, 42 C.M.R. 131 (1970);
United States v. Harvey, 19 U.S.C.M.A. 539, 42 C.M.R. 141 (1970). This overlooks the
fact that the Marines had urged going to their commander, a utilization of accepted
grievance procedure, and that all the men did was talk to him. See Sherman, The
Military Courts and Servicemen's First Amendment Rights, 22 HASrINGS L.J. 325, 354,
361-65 (1971).
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1972 in reversing a court-martial conviction for disloyal statements,
"would render meaningless even that limited freedom of speech
recognized by the military as a soldier's constitutional right."70 The
test applied by the D.C. court, that "there must be truly direct and
palpable prejudice to good military discipline," 71 provides a consider-
ably tighter standard than Bishop's reliance upon a "commander's con-
clusion" that there is a "clear and present danger to military discipline
and efficiency."
The military courts, in applying the clear and present danger test,
have virtually excluded any requirement of proof by the military of
an immediate likelihood that adverse conduct will result from the
speech. Thus, the Court of Military Appeals (COMA) found a clear
and present danger in Lt. Howe's participation in a small, off-post
peace rally not observed by any servicemen except MP's72 and in some
high-blown revolutionary language in an underground newspaper by
Seaman Priest.73 Bishop asserts that "it is hard to see how any ra-
tional person could believe in revolution after reading Priest's ef-
fusions, ' 74 but is satisfied with COMA's finding that statements like
"Today's Pigs Are Tomorrow's Bacon" and "Smash the State" con-
stituted a clear and present danger to military order and discipline
even though there was no evidence of disorder resulting from them.
The long road back from the Dennis75 emasculation of the clear and
present danger test in 1950 through the Yates76 and Brandenburg77
insistence that speech go beyond teaching and advocacy to incitement
of imminent unlawful action has not been traversed by the military
cases. Those cases, Professor Bishop's justifications notwithstanding,
leave servicemen's First Amendment rights largely dependent upon
the indulgence of the military.
IV
The chapters on the war power and martial law contain some in-
sightful historical discussion, but there is a distinctly 1950's flavor
to the analysis of current issues as Bishop defends the concept of a
strong executive and powerful military against contemporary critics.
70. Stolte v. Laird, 353 F. Supp. 1392, 1403 (D.D.C. 1972).
71. 353 F. Supp. at 1406.
72. United States v. Howe, 17 U.S.C.M.A. 165, 37 C.M.R. 429 (1967).
73. United States v. Priest, 21 U.S.C.M.A. 564, 45 C.M.R. 338 (1972).
74. P. 155.
75. Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1950).
76. Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298 (1957).
77. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
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He admiringly says that " '[s]trong' Presidents have moved far and
fast without waiting for Congress, ''" s and asks rhetorically whether
Senator J. W. Fulbright and other such critics had considered "whether
the national interest would have been better served if Congress could
have kept Lincoln and Roosevelt on a shorter leash." 70 "The power
to wage war," he quotes Chief Justice Hughes, "is the power to wage
war successfully,"8' 0 and he finds little to criticize in the way Presidents
Johnson and Nixon went about it in Vietnam.
Professor Bishop, as might be expected, is not a judicial activist,
and his reading of the great cases in which the Supreme Court has
dealt with the war power 8' suggests a cautious and pragmatic approach.
"The plain fact," he says, "is that the Supreme Court's willingness to
apply constitutional brakes varies in exact proportion to the degree of
the emergency in which the Commander in Chief acted and the dis-
tance of the decision from that emergency. 82 Thus, he sees the dif-
ference between Milligan, holding that a civilian southern sympa-
thizer in Indiana was improperly tried by a military commission, and
Quirin, holding that German saboteurs could be tried by a military
commission for violations of the laws of war, as being that "the former
was decided after the last army of the Confederacy had surrendered,
and the latter when the nation was waging war with enemies who
seemed uncomfortably near to winning."83 He also finds the 1967
Robel8 4 decision, holding unconstitutional the Subversive Activities
Control Act making it criminal for Communists to work in a defense
facility, distinguishable from the Japanese exclusion cases "only on the
pragmatic ground that a great war was in progress in 1943, while there
was no comparable crisis in 1967."115
There is a good deal of wisdom in Bishop's skeptical view of the
Supreme Court's motivations in the war power cases, but it can lead
to a judicial relativism which ignores the constitutional delegation of
powers and guarantees of individual rights. For example, he argues
that if Japanese-Americans had posed the same threat as did the
Nazified "Sudetendeutsch" in Czechoslovakia, the action could not
78. P. 182.
79. P. 183.
80. P. 175.
81. Ex parte Vallandingham, 68 U.S. (I Wall.) 243 (1864); Ex parle Milligan, 71 U.S.
(4 Wall.) 2 (1866); Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1 (1942); the Japanese exclusion cases
(Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944); Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S.
81 (1943)); Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
82. P. 188.
83. P. 196.
84. United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258 (1967).
85. P. 200.
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have been found to lack justification. 6 Similarly, he says that if a
newspaper proposed to publish information which really might en-
danger national security, the Pentagon Papers case would have been
decided differently.8 7 He also questions the constitutionality of the
1973 War Powers Resolution"" and doubts its practical effect on the
grounds that "it will be very difficult for Congress to deny support to
the President when the troops are actually fighting."8 10
Bishop's discussion of the power to conscript is heavily colored
by his own predispositions. He dismisses the sophisticated (though un-
successful) constitutional arguments that challenged the constitutionali-
ty of a peacetime draft in the Vietnam War9" as simply an example
that opponents of the draft "never give up."91 His arguments against
the modest expansion of the conscientious objector category by the
Supreme Court in the 1960's are all but lost in derisive rhetoric.
Seeger902 held that a nonreligious person can be entitled to conscien-
tious objector status based on "belief in a relation to a Supreme Be-
ing if his beliefs occupy a parallel place in his life to that filled
by orthodox belief in God;93 Bishop dismisses the holding as a "statu-
tory construction of unique implausibility." 94 His arguments are not
persuasive, and given the sizable number of nonreligious Americans
and the First Amendment ban on establishment of religion, it does
not seem likely that Seeger (and the more explicit Welsh decision)9
will be overturned in the future.
Bishop's chapter on domestic use of the military provides an in-
teresting and useful historical development of martial law but omits
discussion of the most serious contemporary abuse of military power
in the civilian sphere-surveillance and intelligence gathering in the
civilian community. 90 There is little to suggest that, apart from some
misuse of military force in industrial disputes in the late 19th and early
86. P. 199.
87. Pp. 200-01.
88. Act of Nov. 7, 1973, Pub. L. No. 73-148, 87 Stat. 555.
89. P. 181.
90. See Amicus Curiae Brief on Behalf of the Constitutional Lawyers' Committee on
Undeclared War, Massachusetts v. Laird, 400 U.S. 886 (1970); A. D'AMATO & R. O'NEIL,
THE JUDICIARY AND VIETNAM (1972); cf. L. FRIEDMAN & B. NEUBORNE, UNQUESTIONING
OBEDIENCE TO THE PRESIDENT: THE ACLU CASE AGAINST THE LEGALITY OF THE WAR IN
VIETrAM (1972).
91. P. 205.
92. United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163 (1965).
93. Bishop refers to Seeger's expression of a belief in "goodness and virtue" and "a
cosmic order" as "mooncalf metaphysics." p. 209, to Justice Douglas's discussion of
differing cultural approaches to God as "transcendental silliness," p. 210, and to another
CO litigant as "a sappy young man," p. 211.
94. P. 208.
95. Welsh v. United States. 398 U.S. 333 (1970).
96. See Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1 (1972).
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20th centuries, the role of the military in domestic affairs poses any
threat in our society. Professor Bishop assures us that "[t]he military
'governs' the United States no more than does any other powerful
bureaucratic or private lobby," 97 ignoring the fact that the military
commands a large share of the national budget and has members
serving in key positions in the White House and other government
agencies.
As with his discussion of the war power, Professor Bishop is often
willing to find that constitutional limitations on the use of military
power are not applicable in crisis situations. The Milligan rule that
civilians cannot be tried in military courts, even in an area under
martial law if the civilian courts are functioning, is one of the bed-
rocks of our civil-military constitutional construct. But Bishop sug-
gests that military trials could be substituted for civilian in cases of
serious civil disorder in which local jurors might be biased towards
one side. 8 He proposes that the use of the military to arrest and
confine, without charges, is an appropriate way to deal with domestic
violence, suggesting that the Supreme Court would have upheld use of
the armed forces in the 1971 Washington demonstrations if they had
"simply arrested and detained for the duration of the emergency"
the demonstrators who were trying to block traffic and disrupt normal
conditions. 9 This is not all; "had the occasion arisen," he argues, the
Emergency Detention Act of 1950 (finally repealed by Congress in
1971 on the initiative of Japanese-Americans after considerable testi-
mony that it was unconstitutional) could have been constitutionally
used in war, invasion, or insurrection for the arrest and detention of
persons who there was reasonable ground to believe would probably
engage in espionage or sabotage. 00 One must have a strong and abiding
faith in the good will of the executive and the military to be able to
conclude so easily that we should dispense with constitutional processes.
V
A recurrent theme in Bishop's final chapter on the international
law of war is that "[f]aw and morality are not, and (in the present
imperfect state of man) cannot be, coextensive." 1°1 He attacks critics
97. P. 226.
98. Pp. 248-49. Bishop's reference to the practice in Ulster is unfortunate, as the use
there of internment without trial has not only resulted in egregious violations of in-
dividual rights but seems to have exacerbated the conflict by creating causes celbres out
of violations of normal due process. See C. O'BRIEN, STATES OF IRELAND (1973); LONDON
SUNDAY TIMES INSIGHT TEAM, NORTHERN IRELAND: A REPORT ON THE CONFLIcT (1972).
99. P. 250. See Weiner, Helping to Cool the Long Hot Summers, 53 A.B.A.J. 713 (1967).
100. Id.
101. P. 260.
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of American tactics in the Vietnam War for improperly equating in-
ternational law and morality and for condemning as illegal American
actions which offend their own views of morality. The antiwar move-
ment did give rise to loose charges of international illegality. How-
ever, international law and particularly the law of war is grounded
not only upon consent but upon morality. Bishop's rigidly positivistic
view is not entirely consistent with widely shared contemporary no-
tions that states can become bound, without actual agreement or con-
sent, by commonly held standards concerning the conduct of war.
Thus, Richard Falk is quite right in arguing that "the sense of moral
outrage widely shared by people and government is itself relevant to
the identification of rules of international law. Such shared attitudes
identify the limits of acceptable behavior and possess or come to
possess the quality of law.'1 2 The Nuremberg Judgment clearly es-
tablished that neither a state nor a group of states is free to withdraw
from treaty obligations nor to disclaim customary standards of warfare.
Bishop addresses most of the principal criticisms of American tactics
in Vietnam, responding to critics such as Falk and Telford Taylor.
He says that he disagrees with Taylor that "massive firepower, which
necessarily inflicts great suffering on noncombatants, should not be
used to resist guerillas."'103 Actually, Taylor condemned "free fire"
and "free strike" zones outright but questioned the use of massive
firepower in situations in which there was intermingling of enemy and
civilians unless steps were taken to minimize civilian casualties.104
Bishop argues that this reasoning logically leads to a conclusion that
no resistance can be made to a terrorist group if it is ruthless enough
to create conditions in which the innocent are endangered.1° 5 But
this argument misses the point. The ban on use of massive firepower
in such situations is conditional, not absolute. It requires that the
technologically superior force attempt to find lternative methods for
achieving the military purpose which would not endanger civilians and
that steps be taken to minimize civilian casualties through such devices
as control of firepower, exact targeting, and warnings. American prac-
tice in Vietnam, as Taylor described, often fell short of those standards.
Bishop defends the area bombing of cities like Hamburg and Frank-
furt in World War II as necessary because "the RAF had no other
way to knock out... legitimate targets,"'106 and concludes that Amer-
102. Falk, International Law and the Conduct of the Vietnam War, in CLERGY AND
LAYMEN CONCERNED ABOUT VIETNAM, IN TIlE NAME OF AMIrcA 25 (1968).
103. P. 260.
104. T. TAYLOR, NUREMBERG AND VIETNAM: AN AMERICAN TRAGEDY 145, 172-73 (1970).
105. P. 260.
106. P. 267.
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ican bombing in Vietnam, since it "undoubtedly had the military
purpose of destroying enemy troops and supplies and interfering with
their movement,"' 07 was legal. "[W]hether those goals could have been
achieved by less and more discriminating force," he says, is "a military
question which I am no more competent to decide than is Professor
Falk or Mr. [Ramsey] Clark."' 08 The issue, however, is "proportionali-
ty," the international law doctrine that requires that the injury to
noncombatants and their property by use of a particular means of
warfare must not be disproportional to the military advantage to be
gained. This determination is no more a solely military question than
is unconstitutional resort to war by the executive. Civilians like Clark
performed a useful service in bringing to public attention bombing
having immensely serious consequences for the civilian population with
little known military justification. It now appears that there was often
insufficient consideration of proportionality by American bombing
strategists in Vietnam and that the excuse that civilian casualties were
an unavoidable "incidental" effect often masked a failure to search
for alternatives to minimize the effect on civilians.
Bishop's defense of American use of chemical and biological weap-
ons is virtually the official military justification, as are his discussion
of forced relocation of civilians, treatment of civilians, and prisoners
of war. He quite correctly criticizes the "preposterous" position of
North Vietnam that American airmen were not entitled to POW
treatment. 10 9 But his concession that the South Vietnamese "were
guilty of some mistreatment of POW's" 110 is a classic understatement.
He also concedes that "the fighting in Vietnam was unusually dirty,
and the record of the American forces seems to me much worse than
it was in World War II or the Korean War.""' He asserts, however,
that the American record for compliance with the laws of war is
better than that of any other nation in the world,"12 an amazing claim
given the amount of documented evidence of violations by American
forces in Vietnam. "The United States was also guilty of some mis-
treatment of prisoners of war and of some degree of complicity in their
mistreatment by the South Vietnamese," he says, but maintains that
such guilt was not widespread and, besides, "the record of North
Vietnam and the Viet Cong is much worse." 118
107. P. 268.
108. Id.
109. P. 272.
110. P. 273.
111. P. 286.
112. P. 292.
113. Pp. 286-87.
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Despite considerable skepticism as to the effectiveness of the laws
of war, Bishop has no proposals for changes. He attacks the tendency
of writers like Falk and Noam Chomsky to question rules which
virtually foreclose successful guerilla warfare, but he does not con-
sider proposals in the current rewriting of the Geneva Convention.
These proposed changes extend the applicability of the conventions to
certain wars of national liberation, attempting thereby to exact mini-
mal compliance by organized guerillas in return for the privilege of
POW status.1 14 Regarding prosecution for war crimes, Bishop ac-
cepts continued trial in the courts of the accused's own country. The
My Lai experience, 1D however, would seem to indicate that domestic
military tribunals are inadequate for enforcement of the laws of war.
Indeed, it would seem that, after My Lai, renewed efforts for an in-
ternational criminal tribunal are very much in order.
114. See INT'L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, DRAFT ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS TO THE GENEVA
CONVENTIONS OF AUGUST 12, 1949 (June 1973).
115. Only Lt. Calley was successfully prosecuted, and even he has been released on a
writ of habeas corpus because of infirmities in the court-martial process. Calley v.
Calloway, 43 U.S.L.W. 2158 (M.D. Ga., Sept. 25, 1974). Lt. Calley has been released on
bail by order of the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, and the Secretary of the Army has
granted him parole. N.Y. Times, Nov. 9, 1974, at 1, col. 4.
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